Commentary by Quester, George H.
Naval War College Review
Volume 64
Number 3 Summer Article 9
2011
Commentary
George H. Quester
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
This Additional Writing is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Quester, George H. (2011) "Commentary," Naval War College Review: Vol. 64 : No. 3 , Article 9.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/9
COMMENTARY
THE LAST TIME WE WERE AT “GLOBAL ZERO”
George H. Quester
Skeptics of a total elimination of nuclear weapons often point to a “prisoner’s di-
lemma” situation that might emerge, where everyone suspects everyone else of
cheating by secretly retaining or manufacturing atomic bombs. Advocates of
“global zero” sometimes then respond that this is all too theoretical and hypo-
thetical, as we have no way of knowing whether such suspicions would be so
all-powerful in a disarmed world.
Yet one can point out a real-life example of such a global-zero situation, in the
last decades before Hiroshima, where the world’s knowledge of the possibilities
of a nuclear chain reaction was emerging and where the result was a “race” to
build the bomb, with the United States “winning” this race in the Manhattan
Project, Nazi Germany having done very little to produce such weapons.
An attempt will be made here to sort out the similarities and differences be-
tween the world from 1900 to 1945 and a future world where an attempt would
be made to get us back to a total absence of nuclear weapons. If the similarities
are too strong, the outlook for total, or even substantial, nuclear disarmament
might be quite bleak. If the differences are more im-
portant, the pessimistic lessons here of preemption
and distrust might not be so compelling.
COMPARATIVE UNCERTAINTIES ON
CAPABILITY
In the years after 1939, the last theoretical uncertain-
ties about whether nuclear weapons were even possi-
ble had basically been eliminated, but there was great
doubt on all sides as to whether the sheer task of
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generating fissionable uranium-235, or plutonium, was industrially feasible. As
the German, British, American, and Soviet (as well as Japanese) leaderships were
briefed on the possibilities, the questions were always whether their respective
countries could produce such bombs in a reasonable time at a manageable allo-
cation of resources and whether opposing countries could do so.
In a future world, the analogous problems would instead be whether one’s
own country could successfully cheat on the system of international controls
and inspections and whether other countries might be able to do so.
At various stages of the 1939–45 process, the industrial task of producing
such fissionable materials seemed so huge that some British strategists actually
suggested leaking rumors that Britain was entering this race, in order to trick
Nazi Germany into wasting its resources on similar projects.1 (Winston Chur-
chill apparently rejected this option but worried that rumors of a Nazi bomb
projectmight similarly be a trick to get Britain towaste its resources.)2Abit later,
after Britain and the United States had concluded that the bomb was indeed
worth pursuing, the Soviet secret police chief, Lavrenty Beria, apparently feared
that espionage reports of British and American activities were also intended
simply to mislead the Soviet Union.3
We live now unavoidably in a world where it is well established that nuclear
weapons can be made and where fissionable materials are indeed plentiful as
by-products of the generation of electrical power in nuclear reactors. The bar-
rier now would be not the projected industrial difficulty of separating uranium
or reprocessing plutonium but the difficulty of evading inspection.
The Presence or Absence of Conventional War
At a first look wemight conclude that theManhattan Project (and nuclear weap-
ons) would not have emerged except for World War II. It is indeed a historical
fact that the British MAUD project (otherwise code-named TUBE ALLOYS) and
the American Manhattan Project (into which the British project was to be
merged) did not emerge until Nazi Germany had invaded Poland. (Admittedly,
something of a go-ahead on theManhattan Project was given before 7 December
1941, when the United States entered the war.)
Will there be conventional wars in the future that exacerbate international
hatreds and spur resumed pursuit of nuclear weapons? Some advocates of global
nuclear disarmament indeed are assuming that ordinary conventional wars will
now be rare, while others would advocate nuclear zero even if ordinary wars pe-
riodically occurred.
Yet there are some interesting paradoxes to be noted in the 1939–45 experi-
ence. One reason that the British were willing to merge their own nuclear weap-
ons work into that of the Manhattan Project was that the sheer burden of
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continuing the conventional war against Hitler, amid the risks of German
bomber and missile attacks, made it unlikely that Britain could produce atomic
bombs before World War II had ended.4
On the Nazi side, decisions again and again to avoid a major nuclear effort were
based on estimates that no bomb could be produced in time for use in the current
war, given the industrial burdens of all the other weapons projects under way and
the intensity of Allied aerial attack.5 Similar decisions, based on the existence of
the ongoing war, played a role in Japan and the Soviet Union. It was only in the
United States, endowed with major industrial capabilities and a basic immunity to
enemy aerial attack, that the bomb was seen as relevant and feasible.
What if World War II had not begun? What if Hitler had been once again ap-
peased when he attacked Poland or had been content for the time being with oc-
cupying Czechoslovakia? In a continuation of the 1938 theme of “peace in our
time,” would there have been too little enmity and hatred to stimulate the pur-
suit of nuclear weapons? Or would the very absence of bombing and a lowered
drain on resources instead have energized German nuclear physicists, and their
British and American opposite numbers, to seek this “wonder weapon”?
The Role of Dictatorial Regimes
The preemptive fear that drove the Manhattan Project was that Nazi Germany
was seeking the bomb. Dictatorships are more capable of secrecy than are de-
mocracies (although the difference here is not absolute and should not be over-
stated) and are less sympathetic to other peoples, less committed to peace.
Will all the nuclear-capable powers of the future be democracies, or will some
be relatively opaque and internationally unreliable dictatorships? The current
examples of North Korea and Iran would seem to answer the question.
Nazi Germany came into being as a totalitarian dictatorship in part on a plat-
form of anti-Semitism and intolerance of liberal academic standards. The ironic
price was that a significant number of highly competent nuclear scientists were
thus driven out of Germany because they were too liberal or too Jewish to be tol-
erated, and many of these people were to become key players in the Manhattan
Project.6
It is thus interesting to speculate about a Germany where the Nazis did not
come to power (the Nazi takeover in 1933 was indeed far from inevitable) and
the Weimar Republic survived. The majority of physicists around the world who
could have been involved in the design of nuclear weapons had studied or other-
wise spent time at German universities in the 1920s, particularly at Göttingen.
Some of the Hungarian physicists who, like Edward Teller, later worked in the
Manhattan Project had been the victims of anti-Semitism in Hungary and came
to Weimar Germany to escape this. Would not the loyalties of such people have
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leaned toward Germany in such a world, as in fact they later leaned toward the
United States?
If there had ever been a “race” to build atomic bombs between a democratic
Weimar Republic and democratic Britain or the United States, Germany might
have had a clear advantage. But we might all assume today that no such race
would have been run among democracies. Would the advantage in a secret race
for the atomic bomb then have passed to fascist Italy or Soviet Russia? Or would
the enormous industrial investment required and the destructive enormity of
the bombs that could be produced have held everyone back, in the absence of as
frightening a totalitarian state as Nazi Germany and of the war that Hitler
launched?
Or given the secrecy that Joseph Stalin’s USSR and Benito Mussolini’s Italy
could impose, might not some of the same fears and preemptive drives have
driven Britain, the United States, and a still democratic Germany to set up a
MAUD or Manhattan Project?
The Presence of Genocidal Motives
Aside from being secretive and militarily aggressive, Hitler’s Germany was par-
ticularly threatening because it proved to be spectacularly homicidal, killing
millions of people not simply in the process of trying to win a war and conquer
territory but because it wanted to kill them, simply because of their ethnicities.
While the full extent of this was not clear until the German defeat in 1945, there
were many reasons to guess before then that the Nazis were bent on genocide;
rumors and reports emerged after 1933, especially after the Nazi conquest of Po-
land in 1939. It was thus widely assumed that Hitler might use the destructive
power of nuclear weapons if he were ever to acquire them, perhaps to destroy
London, perhaps Paris (after local German commanders ignored his orders that
the French capital be destroyed by conventional means), perhaps Tel Aviv.
Are we truly free of all such genocidal motives in today’s world? One might
note some of the sermons and statements issued by Iranian clergymen declaring
that nuclear weapons might be used to “kill” Israel, statements of motivation
that have no parallel in the strategic pronouncements since 1945 of the other
nuclear-weapons states. If we were thus asked to explain why it was “of course”
necessary to beat Nazi Germany in a race to the atomic bomb, this willingness of
the Nazis to kill people might loom up as an obvious factor, with or without
parallels to the present.
Well short of Hitler’s penchant for genocide, one also might have feared that
Hitler would use the bomb to dictate an Allied surrender to his demands. There
is also speculation that the Nazi bomb would have been used to head off surren-
der to Allied occupation and, thereafter, regime change. Stalin is reported to
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have commented immediately after Hiroshima to the American ambassador,
Averell Harriman, that if Hitler had gotten the bomb he would never have had to
surrender.7 In such a case, even had the advancing Soviet forces been successful
in conventional combat and the British and American forces approaching from
the west equally so, would a Nazi nuclear threat directed at Moscow and London
have been sufficient to force the Allies to stop short of Germany?
Yet we might not have had to encounter so deliberately homicidal a regime as
Nazi Germany to see bombs used to destroy cities—certainly if some state came
uniquely to possess them. The United States used nuclear weapons on Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki not because it wished to kill Japanese city dwellers but be-
cause it wanted to end the war by forcing a surrender by the new threat to
Japanese cities. German physicists who knew of the possibility of nuclear fission
and (quite correctly) suspected the United States had a nuclear weapons project
under way feared that such bombs would be used on German cities for just such
a reason.8 If there was no other reason for this assumption, one had the level of
destruction that had been inflicted in the conventional air raids on Hamburg and
Dresden.
A nuclear monopoly in Hitler’s hands would thus have been particularly wor-
risome in the years after 1939. But such a monopoly in anyone’s hands would
also have been worrisome, and it would be so again in the future.
The Role of Opacity
In the world of nuclear physics of the 1930s and 1940s, all the major players
knew each other quite well. Werner Heisenberg, the likely head of any German
nuclear weapons program, had been a sort of academic mentor to Hans Bethe, a
major figure in the Manhattan Project, and this was typical of relationships
around the globe. Heisenberg’s mentor, in turn, had been Niels Bohr, who es-
caped from Denmark in 1943 to come to Britain and America to give advice on
the Manhattan Project and to brief the Allies on what he knew of German
nuclear efforts.
By comparison, the global population of physicists and nuclear engineers
who would be relevant to nuclear weapons projects today is very much larger, so
the links of personal trust or distrust are generally weaker.
As noted above, dictatorships can keep secrets, but democracies can do so too.
In 1941, at the urging of Leo Szilard, American scientific journals had ceased
publishing articles about nuclear fission, lest this alert and help the Germans.
Some German physicists, noting the absence of new articles, came to the worri-
some conclusion that the Americans might be embarked on bomb projects; this
was in fact only about to be the case—people like Szilard were still alarmed that
the United States had not yet decided to commit enough resources to the project.
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Slightly later, Soviet nuclear physicists similarly became alarmed about the ab-
sence of new articles on nuclear fission in American journals, thus urging Stalin
to initiate a bomb project.9
In the atmosphere of less-than-total openness here, even in democracies, the
world saw a situation of fears and preemptive motives emerging no matter what
one did. If American journals had continued publishing the relevant articles,
fears would have been instilled. When the journals stopped publishing such arti-
cles, fears were instilled all the same.
One sees a similar inevitable opacity and fear in the much-discussed meeting
between Werner Heisenberg and Niels Bohr in 1941 in which Heisenberg’s men-
tion of the generic possibility of bomb projects alarmed and angered Bohr.10 In
retrospect, it is difficult to see how Heisenberg could have reassured Bohr (and
the Allies with whom Bohr was able to communicate) that Nazi Germany would
not, could not, make the atomic bomb, because the mere raising of the possibil-
ity aroused suspicion. Was Heisenberg simply pumping Bohr on what the Amer-
icans and British might be doing? Was he trying to trick the outside world into
missing that the Nazis were out to get the bomb? Or was he saber-rattling to in-
timidate Bohr and his friends?
One sees the same “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” in postwar de-
bates about whether Heisenberg and his colleagues deliberately slowed their
work toward a bomb. The lack of German progress is typically dismissed as Ger-
man incompetence, as the “Aryan” physicists sorely missed the expertise of the
Jewish and other liberal physicists who had been driven out. Heisenberg and his
remaining partners are accused of being intent on producing bombs but not
knowing how to do it.
When it is pointed out that Heisenberg and other Germans indeed under-
stood a fair amount about how atomic bombs could be made (as illustrated in a
brilliant lecture that Heisenberg gave for his fellow internees at Farm Hall im-
mediately after the news of Hiroshima outlining exactly how the Americans had
done it, a lecture recorded by British listening devices), this is seized on as proof
that the Germans were intent on making such bombs themselves.11
Looking ahead to any future world without nuclear weapons, all concerned
will agree that verification, safeguards, and general transparency would be cru-
cial to avoiding the worst-case interpretations of adversary motives illustrated
by the above examples. To repeat, one quick comparison of the cases might give a
very pessimistic impression: the opposing camps of nuclear physicists in 1940
knew each other so extremely well, in the still-small world of people who under-
stood nuclear fission, whereas today there may be thousands of similarly aware
and competent nuclear physicists around the world, hardly enjoying first-name,
student-to-mentor relationships.
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The Role of Assumptions about Military Impact
For a host of very good reasons, we are inclined today to think of nuclear weap-
ons not as military instruments relevant to battlefields but as weapons of mass
destruction, relevant to intimidation and deterrence. The Cold War saw periods
of enthusiasm for “tactical” and other more clearly military uses of nuclear
weapons, but this may to some extent have been a device to make American nu-
clear escalation more credible, as extended nuclear deterrence required that
ways be found to counter the supposed Soviet advantage in conventional forces.
Military professionals perhaps are always inclined to look for more traditional
“battlefield” uses for any new weapon. Also, Western morality disapproves of de-
liberate attacks on civilian targets, while it approves of attempts by navies to sink
opposing navies, or air forces to destroy opposing air forces, etc.
Looking back to our first “race to produce nuclear weapons,” some of the ur-
gency, as noted, was the perception that Hitler would want to use atomic bombs
(if he got them first) to destroy cities and massacre civilians, or at least to
threaten such destruction and massacre. But other concerns pertained to
whether the Germans might use such big bombs on battlefields, perhaps making
them able to cripple a Normandy invasion or the like.
One role of General Leslie Groves as head of the Manhattan Project was to
designate research-related targets in Germany to be attacked with conventional
bombs, and strategic bombing in general played an important role in dampen-
ing any Nazi enthusiasm for a nuclear weapons program. But the question, very
relevant to the future, then emerged of whether the rest of the Manhattan Proj-
ect was therefore necessary. Were American atomic bombs needed to dig out
German nuclear facilities, or would conventional bombing suffice?
President Roosevelt’s response to the letter signed by Einstein warning of
possible German nuclear efforts was to endorse the future Manhattan Project as
a way “to keep the Germans from blowing us up.”12 But is the military linkage
here so clear? Several analogies emerge, in today’s discussions of how to respond
to Iranian and North Korean nuclear efforts. If these facilities are to be attacked
(tomorrow, or in some future world where other states have given up their nu-
clear weapons), will nuclear weapons be necessary and appropriate for the pur-
pose? Many would argue that conventional attacks would be much better, to
hold down collateral damage to those not guilty in the matter.
Even if a future Tehran or Pyongyang sneaks into possession of nuclear weap-
ons and actually uses them, there is an argument even now for a “nuclear paci-
fism,” whereby the response of the United States and the other responsible major
powers would be to impose retaliatory punishment by substantial conventional
attacks.
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Our fears in the early 1940s with regard to Nazi Germany might thus actually
suggest two models for the future. How terrible would it have been if the Ger-
mans got the atomic bomb while they were still doing well on the conventional
battlefield, their armies deep into Russia and occupying France, or during the
post-Stalingrad and post–Normandy invasion when the conventional defeat of
the Nazis was fairly certain? Would they have been able to brandish nuclear
weapons to keep the Americans west of the Rhine and the Russians east of the
Oder? This points to how in a future “global zero” world we would feel about a
conventionally weak, but otherwise obnoxious, adversary sneaking into the pos-
session of nuclear weapons, perhaps to reinsure itself against the regime change
and internationally imposed punishment that it deserved.
The clear question posed here is thus: Will either a strong or a weak conven-
tional adversary, suspected of reaching for nuclear weapons, drive and force the
responsible states quickly to renounce a “nuclear zero” international system and
to race to make nuclear weapons for themselves once again?
SOME VERY TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS
It is surely too early to conclude that “prisoner’s dilemma” mutual fears will doom
any attempt to eliminate nuclear weapons. Yet any exhaustive review of the rea-
soning behind the British TUBE ALLOYS venture and the American Manhattan
Project encounters assumptions about strategy that might seem perfect templates
for the worst-case scenarios of a future nuclear-weapons-free world.
As suggested, the political background of the first “race” to acquire such
weapons may have to be examined much more closely, to sort out the analogies
with the future, to sort out whether “nuclear zero” has any chance of being
achieved and adhered to.
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